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Abstract: The effects of a job-training program on both employment and wages are evaluated,
using data from a randomized study. Principal stratification is used to address, simultaneously,
the complications of noncompliance, wages that are only partially defined because of nonem-
ployment, and unintended missing outcomes. The first two complications are of substantive
interest, whereas the third is a nuisance. The objective is to find a parsimonious model that can
be used to inform public policy. We conduct a likelihood-based analysis using finite mixture
models estimated by the EM algorithm. We maintain an exclusion restriction assumption for
the effect of assignment on employment and wages for noncompliers, but not on missingness.
We provide estimates under the Missing at Random assumption, and assess the robustness of
our results to deviations from it. The plausibility of meaningful restrictions is investigated by
means of scaled log-likelihood ratio statistics. Substantive conclusions include the following.
For compliers, the effect on employment is negative in the short term; it becomes positive in
the long term, but these effects are small at best. For always employed compliers, i.e., com-
pliers who are employed whether trained or not trained, positive effects on wages are found
at all time periods. Our analysis reveals that background characteristics of individuals differ
markedly across the principal strata. We found evidence that the program should have been
better targeted, in the sense of being designed differently for different groups of people, and
specific suggestions are offered. Previous analyses of this data set, which did not address all
complications in a principled manner, led to less nuanced conclusions about Job Corps.
1
Keywords: EM algorithm, finite mixture models, missing at random, noncompliance, partially
defined outcomes, principal stratification, Rubin causal model, training, wages.
1 The Job Corps Study and its complications
Evaluations of government-sponsored job-training programs have typically been undertaken using
data from nonrandomized studies (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). Some social experiments have
also been conducted, because a perfect randomized experiment is the generally accepted tool to
infer causal effects, although this topic has been the subject of debate in the economic literature
(e.g., Heckman et al., 1999; Deaton, 2010; Heckman, 2010; Imbens, 2010).
In a randomized experiment, units are randomly assigned to the treatment group or to the con-
trol group, which ensures that treated and control units have the same expected distribution of
all pre-randomization individual characteristics. Experiments, however, and social experiments in
particular, often suffer from a number of substantially relevant complications, most notably non-
compliance with assigned treatment and partially defined outcomes (e.g., quality of life when dead,
called truncation by death, Rubin, 2000, 2006; McConnell et al., 2008), as well as unintended
missing outcomes. The presence of such complications can shift the focus to causal estimands that
differ from the ones the experiment was originally designed to address, but the randomization still
allows one to estimate some original causal effects for specific subgroups.
Here, we evaluate the effects of Job Corps, which is the largest, most comprehensive US ed-
ucation and job training program for disadvantaged youths between the ages of 16 and 24, using
data from a randomized study, the National Job Corps Study, conducted by Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., involving a national random sample of all eligible applicants in late 1994 and 1995.
Sampled youths were assigned randomly to the program (treatment) group (9, 409) or the control
group (5977), which was essentially embargoed from the program for three years. Interviews were
planned at three subsequent points in time: 52, 130, and 208 weeks after random assignment. We
focus on the effect of the program on employment and wages at these specific weeks.
Regarding the three complications, first, compliance with assigned treatment was imperfect,
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with only 68% of those assigned to the program group immediately enrolling (within the first
semester after assignment) and participating in the program for at least 1 week. Second, wages
are not well defined for those who are not employed. Third, outcome variables are missing for
some participants in the study at the various weeks. Most previous analyses of these data ignored
noncompliance by focusing on intention-to-treat effects of being offered participation in Job Corps
(Lee, 2009; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2007; Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009);
an exception is Schochet (2001), who estimated average effects for compliers using the standard
econometric IV estimator of LATE (Imbens and Angrist, 1994), also called the Complier Average
Causal Effect (CACE, Imbens and Rubin, 1997). However, all previous analyses dropped units
with unintended missing outcomes, restricting the analysis to the subsample of individuals who
both completed the 208-week interview and had no missing relevant outcome values on employ-
ment and wages (Burghardt et al., 2003; Lee, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009; Flores and Flores-Lagunes,
2009), thereby implicitly assuming that the missing data mechanism was Missing Completely at
Random (MCAR; Little and Rubin, 2002).
In our analysis, we include all randomized units and explicitly address all three complications.
The framework we adopt uses potential outcomes to define causal effects regardless of the mode
of inference, often referred to as the Rubin Causal Model (RCM; Holland, 1986); causal effects
are defined by comparisons of potential outcomes on a common set of units (Rubin, 1974, 1978,
2005). We apply Principal Stratification (PS; Frangakis and Rubin, 2002), which was originally
introduced to address post-treatment complications within the RCM. PS has often been used to
represent and solve single complications, but few papers have dealt with more than one complica-
tion simultaneously. In general, the analysis is more complicated than that in the presence of each
of the complications separately, and complexity tends to grow exponentially with the number of
distinct complications.
The three complications have different implications for causal analysis. Specifically, noncom-
pliance and partially defined outcomes limit meaningful estimands to particular principal strata,
and so require new definitions of causal estimands. Missing outcomes are tackled within the same
general framework, but, in contrast, the parameters governing the missingness are considered to
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be nuisance parameters. Because access to Job Corps was essentially denied to those assigned to
the control group, we define compliers to be those individuals who would have immediately en-
rolled if offered the program and all others noncompliers. We further classify the individuals into
principal strata according to the joint values, when assigned to be trained and when assigned not to
be trained, of their (1) potential compliances, (2) potential employment statuses, and (3) potential
missingness behaviors.
Our primary causal estimands are: the average causal effect on employment for compliers and
the average causal effect on wages for the always-employed compliers (i.e., those compliers who
would be employed irrespective of treatment assignment), and those estimands within subgroups
defined by observed characteristics. Other policy-relevant estimands are the relative sizes of the
various principal strata and, when employed, the within-principal-stratum distributions of wages,
under treatment or under control, as well as the distribution of covariates within principal strata.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents some descriptive statistics, showing how some
naive conclusions regarding the effects of the program can be misleading. Section 3 discusses
the framework needed to address the three complications simultaneously. Section 4 outlines the
likelihood approach used to characterize the effects of Job Corps. Section 5 presents the results of
the empirical analysis and provides some concluding remarks.
2 General considerations and descriptive univariate summaries
For all units in the National Job Corps Study, covariates, variables unaffected by treatment assign-
ment, were collected (X). Some subpopulations defined by X were randomized into the program
versus control group with varying, but known, probabilities. We use all units from the original
research sample: we eliminated only the few units who did not complete the baseline interview,
the units who died during the follow-up, and the units who, although assigned to the control group,
were admitted to the program and excluded from the Job Corps study.
Summary statistics for many of the covariates used in our analysis are displayed in Table 1
(N = 13, 987), and reveal some missing values. We addressed this missing data problem using
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the MICE (van Buuren and Oudshoorn, 1999) procedure in R to multiply impute the incomplete
multivariate data. We used only the baseline covariates as predictors in the chained equations, and
included as fully observed covariates indicators of missingness for each of the covariates with a
percentage of missing values above 20%. Linear regressions were used for numerical covariates;
binary/multinomial logistic models for dichotomous/polytomous variables. Ten different imputa-
tions were generated; given the very small variability of results across multiple imputations, as
found also in Zhang et al. (2009), we only present the results from one singly imputed data set
(Rubin, 1987).
Table 2 presents summary statistics for compliance and outcome variables: employment, total
earnings, weekly hours, and hourly wages at the three follow-up interviews. We use a single
missing data indicator at each time point because hours worked (employment status) and wages
are nearly always either both observed or both missing. There is actually a small number of units
(38, 34, 60 at the three weeks, respectively) for whom the employment status is observed but
information on wages is partially missing (e.g., wages are known only for some jobs but not for
others). For these situations, wages were constructed using the same imputation strategy used by
Schochet (2001) in the publicly released data for the subsample of respondents to the 208-week
interview.
Some naive conclusions about the effects of the training program can be drawn from Table
2. For example, by comparing the employment rate of respondent treated units with that of re-
spondent control units, we observe a negative effect at week 52 (−6%), and a small but positive
effect at weeks 130 and 208 (2% and 4%, respectively). These contrasts can be formally inter-
preted, however, neither as estimates of the effect of participation in the program, because they
neglect noncompliance, nor as estimates of ITT effects, because they also neglect nonresponse,
unless under the implausible MCAR assumption. Similarly, we can naively compare the average
hourly wage of respondent employed treated units with that of respondent employed control units,
showing positive effects on wages ranging from 0.24 $/hour to 0.34 $/hour. Again, these estimates
neglect missing data, noncompliance, and partially defined wages due to nonemployment, thus
contrasting averages in groups that are not comparable. Some additional informal comparisons can
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be computed in the form of moment-based IV estimates of local average treatment effects (LATEs,
Imbens and Angrist, 1994), as the ratio of ITT effects for outcomes (i.e., comparisons by treatment
assignment) to the proportion of compliers, still neglecting missing data. For employment, these
estimated LATEs are equal to −0.10, 0.03, and 0.06 at week 52, 130 and 208, respectively. In the
case of wages, estimated LATEs were computed using only the employed units, thus neglecting
missing outcomes and partially defined wages; they are 0.43, 0.48, and 0.34 $/hour at the three
weeks respectively.
3 Technical framework
3.1 General setup
Consider a large hypothetical super-population of individuals, each of whom can potentially par-
ticipate in Job Corps and be assigned treatment z, with z = 1 for active treatment (i.e., offered
enrollment in Job Corps), z = 0 for control. A probability sample of N individuals from this
super-population comprises the participants in the study.
We adopt the Rubin Causal Model as a framework to define causal effects. Assuming SUTVA
(Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption; Rubin, 1978, 1980, 1990), we define, for each unit i and
each post-treatment variable, two potential outcomes, each associated with one of the two treatment
levels that unit i can potentially receive. SUTVA states that potential outcomes for individual i are
unaffected by the treatment assignments of other individuals (no interference), and, for each unit,
that there are no hidden versions of treatment or control being considered.
It is, in principle, feasible to use the PS framework to analyze the three weeks jointly; this,
however, would imply a far larger number of possible principal strata and a consequent growing
complexity of model specification and inference (as in Jin and Rubin, 2009). Although we consider
each of the three weeks independently, our model is still quite complicated. Compared to analyses
conducted by others, however, ours allows one to compare results over the three weeks under
study, because all three are derived using all randomized units, without restriction to those with
complete outcome data at the different weeks (available-case analysis). For unit i, we let Di(1)
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denote the binary compliance indicator when assigned treatment; i.e., Di(1) = 1 implies unit i
would immediately enroll in Job Corps if offered it, and Di(1) = 0 otherwise; Di(0) = 0 ∀i
by definition, and so is suppressed notationally; Di(1) = 1, 0 implies that the ith unit “does” or
“does not” do as assigned. Compliance status does not change over time by definition and can be
considered a covariate, which is not observed for units assigned to the control group. As for the
other post-assignment variables, we suppress notation for the three outcome periods. Respectively,
let S i(z), Wi(z), and Mi(z) represent the potential employment status indicators (1 = employed, 0 =
nonemployed; “S ” for “salaried”), the potential wages, and the potential missingness indicators,
if individual i is assigned to treatment z, z = 0, 1. Following Zhang et al. (2008), because wages
are well-defined only if S i(z) = 1, we define the wages to be Wi(z) = ∗ when S i(z) = 0. In our
study, wages and employment status are either both observed or both missing, so that Mi(z) = 0
when S i(z) and Wi(z) are both observed, and Mi(z) = 1 when S i(z) and Wi(z) are both missing and
are coded as “?”. Individual causal effects are defined as comparisons of potential outcomes, e.g.,
Mi(1) − Mi(0), S i(1) − S i(0), and Wi(1) −Wi(0), where this last quantity is defined to be ∗ if either
Wi(1) or Wi(0) is ∗. At most three of the six potential outcomes are observed, those corresponding
to the treatment level to which unit i is assigned.
The distribution of Z conditional on the observable potential outcomes and observed covariates
defines the assignment mechanism, which allows us to draw inferences about causal estimands
from the observed data. The random assignment of Z in our study within subpopulations defined
by X means that:
Pr (Z|D(1),S(0),S(1),W(0),W(1),M(0),M(1),X) = Pr (Z|X) , (1)
where the bold indicates column vectors of the corresponding unit indicators (e.g., Z = (Z1, ..., ZN)T ).
The observable potential outcomes for a sampled unit are a joint draw from the super-population
distribution. Their distribution is, by definition, unit exchangeable, that is, invariant under a per-
mutation of the unit indices. Therefore, appealing to deFinetti’s theorem, with essentially no loss
of generality, their joint distribution can be written as (Rubin, 1978):
f (D(1),S(0),S(1),W(0),W(1),M(0),M(1),X) = (2)
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∫ ∏
i
f (Di(1), S i(0), S i(1),Wi(0),Wi(1),Mi(0), Mi(1)|Xi, θ) f (Xi|ϕ)p(θ)p(ϕ)dθdϕ,
where the global parameter θ has prior distribution p(θ), and the parameter ϕ governing the distri-
bution of X, is a priori independent of θ. In what follows we will conduct a likelihood analysis for
θ, assuming the value of θ that governed the distribution of observable data has been drawn from a
prior distribution with compact support.
In this framework, D, S, and M play the role of intermediate variables, which allow us to clas-
sify units into some principal strata, which are generally latent. Ignoring, for now, the missingness
mechanism, units can be cross-classified by compliance status and employment status: [{c, n}×
{EE, EN,NE,NN}], into eight groups, where we define:
• c = {i : Di(1) = 1}, the subpopulation of compliers;
• n = {i : Di(1) = 0}, the subpopulation of noncompliers;
• EE = {i : S i(1) = S i(0) = 1}, those who would be employed regardless of their treatment
assignment; for this stratum, Wi(1) and Wi(0) are defined in<+;
• EN = {i : S i(1) = 1 and S i(0) = 0}, those who would be employed only if assigned treatment;
for this stratum, Wi(1) ∈ <+ and Wi(0) = ∗;
• NE= {i : S i(1) = 0 and S i(0) = 1}, those who would be employed only if assigned to the
control group; for this stratum, Wi(1) = ∗ and Wi(0) ∈ <+;
• NN = {i : S i(1) = S i(0) = 0}, those who would be nonemployed regardless of their treatment
assignment; for this stratum, Wi(1) = Wi(0) = ∗.
Without additional assumptions, group membership for unit i, Gi = (Di(1), S i(0), S i(1)), which
takes on values in {c&EE, c&EN, c&NE, c&NN, n&EE, n&EN, n&NE, n&NN}, is unobserved
for all units; by the randomization, however, the eight types have, in expectation, the same distri-
bution in both treatment groups. The strata can be considered covariates unaffected by treatment
assignment, so that, in the same way randomization allows us to compare treated and control units
with the same values of any X variable (e.g., females), we can compare treated and control units
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belonging to the same principal stratum. The only complication is that principal strata can, in
general, be only partially observed, so that conditioning on principal strata is not as simple as con-
ditioning on fully observed covariates. Consequently, assumptions can play far more important
roles with principal strata than with fully observed covariates. Some of these assumptions reduce
the number of principal strata; others impose certain restrictions on the distribution of outcomes
within or among strata: these include various forms of exclusion restrictions.
Without any assumptions on the missingness mechanism, each of the above eight principal
strata is a mixture of four subgroups, according to the pair of potential missing indicators Mi(1),
Mi(0) (units with outcomes never missing (Mi(1) = 0 and Mi(0) = 0), units with outcomes always
missing (Mi(1) = 1 and Mi(0) = 1), units with outcomes missing only under control (Mi(1) = 0
and Mi(0) = 1), and units with outcomes missing only under treatment (Mi(1) = 1 and Mi(0) = 0)).
Among the assumptions about the missing data process proposed in the literature, one that appears
to be plausible in our context is Missing at Random (MAR; Rubin, 1976). MAR cannot be tested
without auxiliary information, and its plausibility depends on the information available in a specific
study. In general, MAR is more reasonable when the set of covariates contains rich information on
units. MAR allows the missingness probabilities to depend on observed values but, given those,
not on any missing values. If MAR holds and the parameters of the missing data mechanism
are distinct from those of the outcome distribution, then the missing data process is said to be
ignorable (Rubin, 1976), meaning that valid likelihood inference ignores the missing data model.
The compliance indicator Di(1) is missing for 1% of units in the treatment group, presumably
due to data coding errors. Throughout, we assume those indicators to be MAR, thus avoiding an
explicit missingness indicator for them.
3.2 Assumptions and estimands
We assume exclusion restrictions for noncompliers for both W and S ; that is, for noncompliers,
potential outcomes do not depend on treatment assignment:
Exclusion restriction for S for noncompliers
If Di(z) = 0 (z = 0, 1), then S i(0) = S i(1).
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Exclusion restriction for W for noncompliers
If Di(z) = 0 (z = 0, 1), then Wi(0) = Wi(1).
These assumptions are substantive ones that may be violated depending on the empirical setting:
Here, they appear rather plausible. The offer to be trained should not alter the activities or the
labour market behavior of those units who are not willing to accept the offer within a reasonable
length of time; in addition, potential employers are plausibly unaware of the assignment status of
noncompliers, so that future job and wage offers cannot be affected by the assignment (see Angrist,
1990, and Angrist et al., 1996, for discussions of possible violations, and see also Schochet, 2001,
for further discussion of them in Job Corps). By virtue of the exclusion restriction on the employ-
ment status, S , we can eliminate the n&EN group and the n&NE group, which would imply an
effect of Z on S for noncompliers. The eight principal strata thus reduce to six: c&EE, c&EN,
c&NE, c&NN, n&EE, n&NN.
Causal estimands of interest are usually, but not always, summaries of individual causal effects
on a common set of units. Here we focus on the following average treatment effects in the super-
population, because participants are randomly drawn from the population of eligible applicants,
and the study has been conducted in order to inform policy makers on the effects of the program
on such target super-populations. Specifically our estimands are:
• the average treatment effect of Z on program participation, D:
∆(ZD) = E[Di(1)|θ] = Pr[Di(1) = 1|θ],
which equals the proportion of compliers in the super-population;
• the average treatment effect of Z on employment, S :
∆(ZS ) = E[S i(1)|θ] − E[S i(0)|θ],
which, by the exclusion restrictions, equals the difference of the proportions of EN and NE
compliers in the super-population
Pr[Gi = c&EN; θ] − Pr[Gi = c&NE; θ];
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• the average treatment effect of Z on employment, S , for compliers, which is usually inter-
preted as the effect of participation, D, on S :
∆(DS ) = E[S i(1)|Di(1) = 1; θ] − E[S i(0)|Di(1) = 1; θ]
= Pr[Gi = c&EN |c; θ] − Pr[Gi = c&NE|c; θ].
In our analysis of JC, the effect of assignment for compliers is interpreted as the effect of
immediate participation in JC relative to non-immediate participation, which may include no
participation in any training program, participation in other training programs available on
the market, or later participation in JC.
• the average treatment effect of Z on wages, W, for the always employed compliers, which is
interpreted as the effect of participation on wages for the always-employed:
∆(DW) = E[Wi(1)|Gi = c&EE; θ] − E[Wi(0)|Gi = c&EE; θ].
In the last two formulas, the expectations are taken over a subset of the entire super-population, the
compliers for ∆(DS ) and the always-employed compliers for ∆(DW).
The relative sizes in the population of the six principal strata are themselves relevant descriptive
estimands:
Pr[Gi = g|θ], g ∈ G.
All previous estimands can be defined also conditional on specific values of some of the covariates.
Policy-relevant information can also be obtained from our likelihood analysis about the distribution
of baseline characteristics within each principal stratum, for example, the means of the covariates
within strata:
µX,g = E[Xi|Gi = g; θ], g ∈ G.
The ability to characterize the latent subgroups of units in terms of their initial conditions is an
advantage of the approach we adopt, and may be particularly useful for targeting future interven-
tions.
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4 Mode of inference
4.1 Observed groups of units
Inference can be viewed as a missing data problem, because we cannot observe which stratum
each unit belongs to. For each unit i, the treatment assignment indicator Zi and the covariates Xi
are always observed. Further, for unit i the other observed values are Mi(Zi) = Mi,obs; if Mi(Zi) = 0,
S i(Zi) = S i,obs and Wi(Zi) = Wi,obs; and for 99% of the units, we also observe Di(1) when Zi = 1.
We denote by D(1), Mobs, Sobs and Wobs the corresponding vectors of observed values; note that
if Mi,obs = 1 then S i,obs =? and Wi,obs =?; if S i,obs = 0 then Wi,obs = ∗; if Z1 = 0 then Di(1) =?; if
Zi = 1 and Di(1) is missing, then Di(1) =?.
Among units with observed outcomes, we can observe the following groups, defined according
to different combinations of observed Z, D and S :
• O(1, 1, 1) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 1 and S i,obs = 1}, those who are assigned to the treatment
group, take the treatment, and are employed; they are a mixture of the two principal strata
c&EE and c&EN;
• O(1, 1, 0) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 1 and S i,obs = 0}, those who are assigned to the treatment
group, take the treatment, and are nonemployed; they are a mixture of the two principal strata
c&NE and c&NN;
• O(1, 0, 1) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 0 and S i,obs = 1}, those who are assigned to the treat-
ment group, do not comply with assignment, and are employed; they belong to the principal
stratum n&EE;
• O(1, 0, 0) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 0 and S i,obs = 0}, those who are assigned to the treatment
group, do not comply with assignment, and are not employed; they belong to the principal
stratum n&NN;
• O(1, ?, 1) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) =? and S i,obs = 1}, those who are assigned to the treatment
group, with missing compliance status, and are employed; they are a mixture of the three
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principal strata c&EE, c&EN, n&EE;
• O(1, ?, 0) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) =? and S i,obs = 0}, those who are assigned to the treatment
group, with missing compliance status, and are not employed; they belong to the three prin-
cipal strata c&NE, c&NN, n&NN;
• O(0, ?, 1) = {i : Zi = 0,Di(1) =? and S i,obs = 1}, those who are assigned to the control group
and are employed; they are a mixture of the three principal strata c&EE, c&NE, n&EE;
• O(0, ?, 0) = {i : Zi = 0,Di(1) =? and S i,obs = 0}, those who are assigned to the control group
and are not employed; they are a mixture of the three principal strata c&EN, c&NN, n&NN.
For units with missing outcomes, the values of S and W are not observed; the observed groups are:
• O(1, 1, ?) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 1 and S i,obs =?}, those who are assigned to the treatment
group and take the treatment; they are a mixture of the four principal strata c&EE, c&EN,
c&NE, c&NN;
• O(1, 0, ?) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 0 and S i,obs =?}, those who are assigned to the treatment
group and do not comply with assignment; they are a mixture of the two principal strata
n&EE, n&NN;
• O(0, ?, ?) = {i : Zi = 0,Di(1) =? and S i,obs =?}, those who are assigned to the control group
and therefore have unknown compliance status; they are a mixture of all the principal strata
in G.
In Table 3, the correspondence between observed and latent groups is summarized.
4.2 Distributions for groups and potential outcomes given covariates
In order to form the likelihood function, we need to specify, first, a model for the principal stratum
membership, G, given X and, second, the distribution of the potential wages conditional on G and
X. Note that X includes all the covariates, as defined in Table 1. For the covariates with a proportion
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of missing data larger than 20% (parents’ education and household income), we also included
the missing indicators as well as interaction terms of those indicators with the covariates. The
missing indicators may capture some salient features of the subjects: e.g., ignorance of parents’
education may be associated with loss, absence of the parents’ influence or extremely low parent’s
education, and thus may indicate a more disadvantaged situation. For the same reasons, missing
indicators of these three variables were also used as fully observed covariates in the initial multiple
imputation of missing covariates’ values. Following Zhang et al. (2009), design weights are
also included as a covariate in the models. By integrating the complete-data likelihood over the
missing potential outcomes, under MAR, the observed data likelihood function is a finite mixture
model likelihood (see, e.g., Imbens and Rubin, 1997), which can be maximized using the EM
(Expectation-Maximization) algorithm (Dempster, Laird and Rubin, 1977). The steps of the EM
algorithm used in the estimation procedure are derived and presented in the Appendix.
To simplify the notation, we assume that X includes the constant term – that is, a column
containing the unit vector. We specify a multinomial logistic model for the k-dimensional vector
of principal strata memberships:
Pr(Gi = g|Xi;α) = exp{Xiαg}∑k
h=1 exp{Xiαh}
= pii:g
where g ∈ G, and the kth principal stratum (n&NN) is taken as the baseline (that is, αk = 0), and
let pii:g be the probability of belonging to stratum g for unit i, given the vector of pre-treatment
covariates Xi. Alternative specifications, such as sequential logistic models, multinomial probit
models, or their t-based extensions (Liu, 2004), could also be used.
We specify a Normal distribution for log-wages conditional on covariates X:
i f Gi = c&EE, log[Wi(1)] ∼ N(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1),
log[Wi(0)] ∼ N(Xiβc&EE,0, σ2c&EE,0),
i f Gi = c&EN, log[Wi(1)] ∼ N(Xiβc&EN,1, σ2c&EN,1),
i f Gi = c&NE, log[Wi(0)] ∼ N(Xiβc&NE,0, σ2c&NE,0),
i f Gi = n&EE, log[Wi(1)] ∼ log[Wi(0)] ∼ N(Xiβn&EE, σ2n&EE).
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Notationally, we let Ni(µ, σ) be the probability density function of a Normal distribution with mean
µ and variance σ evaluated at log(Wi). Zhang et al. (2009) already showed, for the same study, that
alternative Box-Cox transformations (other than the logarithmic one and corresponding to different
parametric families of distributions for wages) do not alter results significantly; so we maintained
the assumptions of log-normality of wages conditional on principal strata, treatment assignment
and a large set of covariates.
For the c&EE group, the parameters of the wage distribution vary between the treatment
groups; for the c&EN group, wages are only defined on <+ if Zi = 1; for the c&NE group,
wages are only defined on <+ if Zi = 0. The exclusion restriction implies that for the n&EE
group, the distribution of wages is the same in the two treatment groups, therefore the parameters
of their wage distributions are restricted to be the same irrespective of treatment assignment. For
the c&NN and n&NN groups, there are no associated wage distributions defined on<+ (i.e., they
are ∗).
We denote by θsci = {α,β,σ} the vector parameter of scientific interest, a function of θ assumed
to be distinct from the function of θ, θmis, governing the missingness mechanism, where
α = (αc&EE,αc&EN ,αc&NE,αc&NN ,αn&EE),
β = (βc&EE,1,βc&EE,0,βc&EN,1,βc&NE,0,βn&EE),
σ = (σc&EE,1, σc&EE,0, σc&EN,1, σc&NE,0, σn&EE).
Assuming MAR, the observed data likelihood function is proportional to the joint distribution of
(D(1),Sobs,Wobs|Z,X, θsci):
L(θsci|D(1),Sobs,Wobs,Z,X) ∝∏
i∈O(1,1,1)
[
pii:c&EENi(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1) + pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ
2
c&EN,1)
]
×
∏
i∈O(1,1,0)
[pii:c&NE + pii:c&NN] ×
∏
i∈O(1,0,1)
[
pii:n&EENi(Xiβn&EE, σ2n&EE)
]
×
∏
i∈O(1,0,0)
[pii:n&NN]
×
∏
i∈O(1,?,1)
[
pii:c&EENi(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1) + pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ
2
c&EN,1) + pii:n&EENi(Xiβn&EE,1, σ
2
n&EE,1)
]
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×
∏
i∈O(1,?,0)
[pii:c&NE + pii:c&NN + pii:n&NN]
×
∏
i∈O(0,?,1)
[
pii:c&EENi(Xiβc&EE,0, σ2c&EE,0) + pii:c&NENi(Xiβc&NE,0, σ
2
c&NE,0) + pii:n&EENi(Xiβn&EE, σ
2
n&EE)
]
×
∏
i∈O(0,?,0)
[pii:c&EN + pii:c&NN + pii:n&NN]
×
∏
i∈O(1,1,?)
[pii:c&EE + pii:c&EN + pii:c&NE + pii:c&NN] ×
∏
i∈O(1,0,?)
[pii:n&EE + pii:n&NN] .
The units in the O(0, ?, ?) group do not carry any information and vanish from the likelihood
function (because
∑
g pii:g = 1). The likelihood function of normal mixture models is not a bounded
function on the usual parameter space (Kiefer and Wolfowitz, 1956; Day, 1969). However, in
spite of this unboundedness, Peters and Walker (1978) prove that, given any sufficiently small
neighborhood of the true parameter, with probability one, the MLE exists, it is unique and it is
(locally) strongly consistent. Redner (1981) proves that the MLE exists and it is globally consistent
in every compact parameter subset containing the true value of the parameter. Consequently, we
can exploit standard mixture model analysis (e.g., see Titterington et al., 1985) for identification
and inference. Except in the very special case when the proportions of the mixture components
are the same, we can uniquely estimate the mixture parameters (see also Everitt and Hand, 1981,
Gelman et al., 2004, and Zhang et al., 2009).
As a robustness check, alternative nonignorable missingness assumptions are considered in
the empirical analysis, based on different behavioral hypotheses on the missingness mechanism.
Details on these assumptions and the ML analysis under them are presented in the Appendix.
4.3 Estimation of causal estimands
Causal effects are estimated in each principal stratum as functions of the observed data and the
ML estimates of parameters, averaging over the estimated population distribution of covariates in
that principal stratum using the design weights to weight the N units in the sample to represent the
superpopulation. More explicitly, letting pˆii:g = Pr(Gi = g|Xi, αˆ), we estimate the proportion in
each stratum as
pˆig =
∑N
i=1 ωipˆii:g∑N
i=1 ωi
,
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where ωi are design weights in the original survey. Then, the causal effect of Z on D is estimated
as the proportion of compliers: ∆ˆ(ZD) = pˆic&EE + pˆic&EN + pˆic&NE + pˆic&NN = pˆic, and the causal effect
of Z on S is estimated as the difference of the estimated proportions of EN and NE compliers:
∆ˆ(ZS ) = pˆic&EN − pˆic&NE. Similarly, estimates of the average treatment effects on employment for
compliers, and on wages for always-employed compliers are obtained as:
∆ˆ(DS ) =
pˆic&EN − pˆic&NE
pˆic
and
∆ˆ(DW) =
∑N
i=1 ωipˆii:c&EE exp
{
Xiβˆc&EE,1 + 12σˆ
2
c&EE,1
}
∑N
i=1 ωipˆii:c&EE
−
∑N
i=1 ωipˆii:c&EE exp
{
Xiβˆc&EE,0 + 12σˆ
2
c&EE,0
}
∑N
i=1 ωipˆii:c&EE
respectively.
In order to characterize the latent subgroups, the means of the covariates within each principal
stratum are estimated as follows:
µˆX,g =
∑N
i=1 ωipˆii:gXi∑N
i=1 ωipˆii:g
.
By using the estimated principal strata membership proportion pˆii:g, we are implicitly imputing the
potential outcome for given ωi and Xi an infinite number of times, thus estimating superpopulation
parameters. If the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimates were obtained, the asymptotic
standard errors of the above quantities could be computed using the Delta method or methods such
as the SEM algorithm (Meng and Rubin, 1991). However, even in relatively large samples, the
sampling distribution of ML estimators is usually not well approximated by the standard asymp-
totic normal distribution because the likelihood function for mixture models is generally not close
to normal. For this reason, we focussed on comparisons of the maximized likelihood function
under the general model and under various meaningful restrictions using a direct likelihood ap-
proach advocated in some situations by Fisher (1921), Barnard et. al (1962), Barnard (1965),
Hacking (1965), Edwards (1972), Royall (1997), and recently discussed in Boyles (2008) and used
in Zhang et al. (2009) in a related problem.
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5 Likelihood-based estimation: results
5.1 Likelihood estimation of causal estimands under MAR
We discuss results obtained by maximizing the likelihood function and provide ML estimates of
the average treatment effects on employment (∆(DS )) and wages (∆(DW)) for each week separately,
together with the estimated proportions of the principal strata, as described in Section 4.3. We do
not report maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters, which are however available
upon request from the authors. Most of the covariates’ coefficients have the expected sign; for
example, higher educated people tend to have higher wages irrespective of their principal stratum.
We also compare the maximized likelihood under the general model with the maximized likeli-
hoods under three meaningful restrictions: (a) monotonicity of employment: pic&NE = 0; (b) no
effect of assignment on employment for compliers: ∆(DS ) = 0; and (c) no effect of assignment on
wages for the always-employed compliers: ∆(DW) = 0. Specifically, Table 4 presents values of the
scaled log-likelihood ratio statistic, λ, for the general model versus models with restrictions, cal-
culated as −2log(Λ)/d f , where Λ is the ratio of the maximized likelihood under the general model
and under a model with specific restrictions, and where d f is equal to the difference of the number
of parameters in the models. A strong deviation of this quantity from one provides evidence that
the corresponding restriction is not supported by the data.
The overall results on average causal estimands suggest the following summaries.
First, monotonicity of employment is not supported by the data at any week (see the values
of λM in Table 4), suggesting that all assumed six latent strata exist, and that there is a positive
proportion of compliers, pic&NE, for whom training appears detrimental in terms of employment. A
possible conjecture is that these people might have raised their reservation wages as a consequence
of training, and refuse job offers that would be accepted with no training. As expected, the pro-
portions of c&NE decreases over time, and the non-negligible percentage of them four years after
assignment may be simply due to the structural mobility in and out of employment of American
youths.
Second, the proportions of pic&NE and pic&EN appear to be roughly equal to each other at all three
18
time points, thus suggesting that the average effect of assignment on employment for compliers is
absent. In fact, the restriction of no average effect of assignment on employment appears to be
plausible at all three weeks (see the values of λ0W in Table 4). However, the point estimates of
these effects are larger than the ITT effects on employment found in Zhang et al. (2009) at week
208, which were diluted by noncompliance to treatment assignment. The negative point estimate
of the effect on employment in the short term (of about −2.4% at week 52) and the positive ones in
the long term (of about 2.2% at week 130 and 1.3% at week 208) are consistent with the empirical
literature on the effect of active labor market policies, which suggests that almost all programs
reduce employment in the short run (e.g., Lechner and Wunsch, 2007; van Ours, 2004). Note that,
by looking at the sizes of the two groups of c&NE and c&EN, instead of at the overall effect on
employment for compliers, our analysis offers a more refined understanding of how such a small
estimated effect on employment was produced.
Third, no effect of assignment on wages for the always-employed compliers is rejected by the
data at all weeks (see values of λS 0 in Table 4): From Table 5, we see that the average effect of
assignment on wages is found to be small but positive (about 0.28, 0.25 and 0.29 $/hour at weeks
52, 130 and 208, respectively), corresponding to approximately 4 to 5% increases relative to the
average wage with no JC. Again, this is a different finding from Zhang et al. (2009), where the ef-
fect of assignment on wages for the always-employed at week 208 was found to be negligible, after
discarding units with missing outcomes, thus not adhering to the ITT principle. Note that, although
the effect on employment is ideally estimated for the same group of units over the three weeks, i.e.,
compliers, the effects on wages are for the latent group of the always-employed compliers, which
includes different units at different weeks.
Our results deviate from the naive conclusions one could draw from simple descriptive contrasts
presented in Section 2; naive comparisons and simple IV comparisons, which neglect some of
the complications, appear to overestimate the impact of the program. Differences between these
contrasts and the estimated causal effects are larger at week 208, especially for wages, possibly
due to the larger missingness rate observed at this week.
These are general overall results, which offer information on the effects of assignment for
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compliers, and thus the effects of participation in the program. However, simply looking at average
effects limits the usefulness of the results, which do not offer particularly strong evidence in favor of
the effectiveness of Job Corps, yet do not provide any constructive information to help understand
what could be improved in the implementation of such a program. The framework we adopted,
however, is not only a proper one for formally dealing with the complications of JC, but it also
allows one to exploit the presence of these complications to extract additional information from
the data. Specifically, further insights into the principal strata can be obtained by analyzing both
the distribution of background characteristics and the distribution of wages within the strata; those
analyses can generate useful suggestions for the re-design of the program. In Table 5, the estimated
average wages for all strata under treatment and under control are reported, along with asymptotic
standard errors, in order to have a rough quantification of the sampling variability. In Tables 6, 7
and 8, the estimated means of the covariates within each stratum are reported, obtained using, for
each unit, the design weights and the estimated membership probabilities.
The distribution of covariates among noncompliers suggests that the reasons for noncompliance
may differ, implying that better suited programs should have been offered to different subjects.
The average characteristics of the n&EE individuals show that they are in general older and better
educated with longer labour market experience: most of them already worked, had longer tenure
in previous jobs and were better paid. They thus appear to be people, on average, who should not
have been targets of the program in the first place. Conversely, the never-employed noncompliers,
n&NN, are in general less likely to be white and more likely to be female and have children;
they appear to be the right target of the program, and so their decision to not participate in the
program may be partly explained by objective difficulties of participation due to family constraints,
suggesting a more flexible training schedule for them may have satisfied their requirements.
Regarding the groups who participated in the program, the never-employed compliers, c&NN,
are, in general, less likely to be well educated or white, they had shorter tenure in previous jobs
and were paid less. They appear to be mostly disadvantaged individuals, with the worst average
initial conditions. For them, participation in the program was not beneficial in terms of employ-
ment, suggesting a re-designed intervention for them, even more focussed on the disadvantaged
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participants, allowing them to improve their educational levels and acquire job-specific skills, or
providing help with their job-search activities.
Compliers who are “sometimes employed” (c&NE and c&EN) are generally less likely to be
female, to have children, or to have a partner; and more likely to be white. These characteristics
suggest that these subjects are more mobile in the labor market and have fewer constraints than
others; they are thus more likely to be observed without a job. This finding is also consistent
with the evidence from Table 5 that these compliers have higher post JC average wages than the
always employed compliers, c&EE, suggesting that these groups comprise individuals who are
more selective when deciding whether to accept a job offer: they tend to have better paid but
less stable jobs. This possibly mitigates the apparently disappointing result of a small effect of
participation on employment.
The group of the always-employed compliers, c&EE, for whom the effect on wages was
sought, does not show striking differences from the other compliers, except for the level of their
wages, which from Table 5 appears to be lower, under either treatment or control, than the other
groups when employed, c&NE, c&EN, and n&EE. The effect on wages for them is a positive and
stable one, so that, for the c&EE subgroup, the program was mildly successful, in absolute and
relative terms, in increasing labor productivity reflected in a wage increase.
In order to assess the robustness of our results to deviations from ignorability, we also provide
estimates of causal effects, as well as the values of the scaled LRT statistics, obtained by maximiz-
ing the likelihood under Latent Ignorability (LI) and two different sets of restrictions, as detailed
in the Appendix. Results, reported in Table 9, show that the estimates of the relevant treatment
effects are not sensitive to these three alternative assumptions on the missing data mechanism. In
addition, the values of the scaled LRT statistics show that the data, also under LI, neither sup-
port monotonicity of employment nor a null effect on wages for the always employed compliers,
but the data do support a null effect on employment for compliers. We argue that this substan-
tial similarity of results, under ignorable and simple nonignorable models, is because we always
condition on a rich set of baseline characteristics, which provide for relatively good predictions of
the latent principal strata and of the missing potential outcomes. They also mitigate distributional
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assumptions on the potential outcomes within strata. Once we condition on these covariates, the
missingness assumptions (as well as the distributional assumptions, as highlighted in Zhang at. al,
2009) make only minor differences, which stresses the importance of collecting baseline charac-
teristics in experimental studies: they may help deal with subsequent complications that ”break”
the initial randomization.
5.2 Discussion
The framework we used, and the tools we developed, are appropriate for conducting an even more
comprehensive longitudinal analysis. This, however, would have implied a growing number of
principal strata, so we analyzed the three weeks separately. Even so, consistent results were ob-
tained. For example, the percentage of noncompliers, which should be constant across all weeks,
but not constrained to be so in our analysis, is estimated from Table 3 to be around 28 −29% at all
weeks. This result can be seen as a simple diagnostic for the fit of our models.
Our analysis not only allowed the assessment of the overall effects of the program, but also the
assessment of whether the program was well targeted, for whom the program worked best, and for
which outcome. In fact, a policy relevant result obtained in this paper was the ability to characterize
the latent subgroups in terms of their initial pre-treatment conditions. The most disadvantaged
groups, with the worst average initial conditions in terms of education, labour market experience,
race and gender, are the never-employed (c&NN and n&NN), who did not benefit from the training
program even when they decided to participate (c&NN). The groups of compliers who benefited
from participation in terms of employment or wages appear to be less disadvantaged on average
than the never-employed.
These findings may be useful to help re-design the program for better effectiveness: the nu-
anced results resolve much of the interpretational issues because they directly inform the policy-
maker about whether the program was well-targeted, whether it was uniformly effective for all the
subjects, and about which of its objectives may have been achieved. In fact, as with most of the
large job-training programs, Job Corps had, and still has, different aims and employed a mixture
of instruments to try to reach them. Training activities may be specifically targeted at particular
22
groups (e.g., the young or the disabled), may be designed to prevent long periods out of regu-
lar employment, or to integrate unemployed and disadvantaged individuals into the labour force,
or they may be more oriented towards augmenting participants’ human capital, either by helping
them earn a higher educational degree or by formal teaching of new vocational skills. Job Corps
employs “a holistic career development training approach which [sic] integrates the teaching of
academic, vocational, employability skills and social competencies through a combination of class-
room, practical and based learning experiences to prepare youth for stable, long-term, high-paying
jobs”. From our findings, Job Corps seems to have been successful only in augmenting partic-
ipants’ human capital, as measured by the effects on wages for the always-employed compliers,
although it does not seem to have enhanced the employability of the more disadvantaged.
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Appendix
Ignorable and nonignorable missing data mechanisms.
The joint distribution of observable potential outcomes given X, f (D(1),S(0),S(1),W(0),W(1),M(0),M(1)|X) (see
equation 2), can be decomposed into one factor modelling the quantities of scientific interest
fsci(D(1),S(0),S(1),W(0),W(1)|X, θsci),
and one factor representing the missingness mechanism, i.e., the distribution of the missing indicators given the other
potential outcomes and covariates: fmis(M(0),M(1)|D(1),S(0),S(1),W(0),W(1),X, θmis), where θsci and θmis are the
functions of θ governing the corresponding distributions. Under MAR and if the parameters of the missing data
mechanism, θmis), are distinct from those of the outcome distributions, θsci), the missing data process is ignorable
(Rubin, 1976), meaning that valid likelihood inference ignores the missing data model.
Nonignorable missing-data mechanisms are often difficult to specify because there is rarely direct evidence in
the data about the relationship between the missing-data mechanism and the missing values themselves. It is usually
advisable to consider several nonignorable models, and to explore the sensitivity of estimates of relevant causal es-
timands to the different models, using a baseline analysis under MAR as a primary benchmark for comparison. In
a PS framework, a plausible nonignorable missingness assumption is “Latent Ignorability” (LI), originally proposed
by Frangakis and Rubin (1999) in a setting with noncompliance. Because here the scientifically relevant principal
strata, Gi, are defined according to noncompliance and potential employment status, we formulate Latent Ignorability
to mean that, if we knew the group membership (Gi) of each unit, the missingness mechanism would be ignorable:
fmis(Mi(0), Mi(1)|Di(1), S i(0), S i(1),Wi(0),Wi(1),Xi, θmis) = (3)
fmis(Mi(0), Mi(1)|Gi,Wi(0),Wi(1),Xi, θmis) = fmis(Mi(0), Mi(1)|Gi,Xi, θmis).
Under this assumption, given the covariates and treatment assignment, units with the same compliance behavior and
potential employment status (and so with the same value of Gi) are expected to have the same distribution of wages,
regardless of their missingness behavior. However, because the true compliance behaviors and the potential employ-
ment statuses are partially unobserved, the missing data process is nonignorable. We assume that the joint distribution
of Mi(0), Mi(1), fmis(Mi(0), Mi(1)|Gi,Xi, θmis), has twelve independent parts, two for each of the six principal strata
defined by Gi, which are assumed to be conditionally independent. Specifically, let
ρi:g,z = Pr(Mi(z) = 1|Gi = g,Xi; θg,zmis)
be the probability of missing outcomes for unit i, i = 1, ...,N, when assigned treatment z, conditional on principal
stratum membership g and Xi; θmis = {θg,zmis}, (g ∈ G, z = {0, 1}). These probabilities can be regarded as nuisance
unknowns of little intrinsic scientific interest and, depending on the empirical context, modified versions of exclusion
restrictions for them found in the literature may be plausible.
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The first exclusion restriction assumes that compliers have the same probability of having a missing outcome
irrespective of treatment assignment and employment status; similarly noncompliers have the same same probability of
having a missing outcome irrespective of employment status, but these probabilities are allowed to differ by treatment
assignment. This is a similar assumption to the response exclusion restriction for compliers proposed in Mealli et al.
(2004):
ρi:c&EE,1 = ρi:c&EN,1 = ρi:c&NE,1 = ρi:c&NN,1 = ρi:c&EE,0 = ρi:c&EN,0 = ρi:c&NE,0 = ρi:c&NN,0,
ρi:n&EE,1 = ρi:n&NN,1 (4)
ρi:n&EE,0 = ρi:n&NN,0.
Because compliers are willing to follow the protocol in their assigned treatment, it seems more plausible that the
missingness mechanism would not be affected by that assignment and the subsequent employment status.
The second exclusion restriction posits that noncompliers have the same probability of having a missing outcome
irrespective of their treatment assignment and post-treatment employment status; similarly compliers have the same
probability of having a missing outcome irrespective of employment status, but these probabilities are allowed to
differ in the two treatment arms. This is a similar assumption to the response exclusion restriction for never-takers in
Frangakis and Rubin (1999):
ρi:c&EE,1 = ρi:c&EN,1 = ρi:c&NE,1 = ρi:c&NN,1
ρi:c&EE,0 = ρi:c&EN,0 = ρi:c&NE,0 = ρi:c&NN,0 (5)
ρi:n&EE,1 = ρi:n&NN,1 = ρi:n&EE,0 = ρi:n&NN,0.
Under LI and either of these two sets of Assumptions (4 or 5), the missingness mechanism is not ignorable because
the missingness probabilities do not factor out of the likelihood.
Specifically, let θ = {α,β,σ, θmis} denote the vector parameter, where θmis is the sub-vector of parameters govern-
ing the missingness probabilities in (3). Assuming LI, the likelihood function is derived as proportional to the joint
distribution of (D(1),Mobs,Sobs,Wobs|Z,X, θ):
L(θ|D(1),Mobs,Sobs,Wobs,Z,X) ∝ (6)∏
i∈O(1,1,1)
[
ρ¯i:c&EE,1pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1) + ρ¯i:c&EN,1pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ
2
c&EN,1)
]
×
∏
i∈O(1,1,0)
[
ρ¯i:c&NE,1pii:c&NE + ρ¯i:c&NN,1pii:c&NN
] × ∏
i∈O(1,0,1)
[
ρ¯i:n&EE,1pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ2n&EE)
]
×
∏
i∈O(1,0,0)
[
ρ¯i:n&NN,1)pii:n&NN
] × ∏
i∈O(1,?,1)
[
ρ¯i:c&EE,1pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1)
+ρ¯i:c&EN,1pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ2c&EN,1) + ρ¯i:n&EE,1pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ
2
n&EE)
]
×
∏
i∈O(1,?,0)
[
ρ¯i:c&NE,1pii:c&NE + ρ¯i:c&NN,1pii:c&NN + ρ¯i:n&NN,1pii:n&NN
]
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×
∏
i∈O(0,?,1)
[
ρ¯i:c&EE,0pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,0, σ2c&EE,0)
+ρ¯i:c&NE,0pii:c&NE Ni(Xiβc&NE,0, σ2c&NE,0) + ρ¯i:n&EE,0pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ
2
n&EE)
]
×
∏
i∈O(0,?,0)
[
ρ¯i:c&EN,0pii:c&EN + ρ¯i:c&NN,0pii:c&NN + ρ¯i:n&NN,0pii:n&NN
]
×
∏
i∈O(1,1,?)
[
ρi:c&EE,1pii:c&EE + ρi:c&EN,1pii:c&EN + ρi:c&NE,1pii:c&NE + ρi:c&NN,1pii:c&NN
]
×
∏
i∈O(1,0,?)
[
ρi:n&EE,1pii:n&EE + ρi:n&NN,1pii:n&NN
] × ∏
i∈O(0,?,?)
∑
g∈G
ρi:g,0pii:g
 .
where ρ¯i:g,z = 1 − ρi:g,z, and the missingness probabilities are specified using binary logistic models:
ρi:g,z =
exp{Xiθg,zmis}
1 + exp{Xiθg,zmis}
.
Missingness probabilities are regarded as nuisance unknowns, in contrast to parameters of the outcome principal strata
distributions, which define causal estimands of interest. We maximize the likelihood under each of the two sets of
restrictions (4) and (5).
EM steps under MAR
The complete-data log-likelihood function given the principal strata Gi, i.e. treating G as the missing data, under
ignorability can be written as follows:
l(θsci|D(1),Mobs,Sobs,Wobs,G,Z,X) ∝∑
i∈O(1,1,1)
I(Gi = c&EE) log
[
pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,1)
I(Gi = c&EN) log
[
pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ2c&EN,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,0)
I(Gi = c&NE) log [pii:c&NE] +
∑
i∈O(1,1,0)
I(Gi = c&NN) log [pii:c&NN]
+
∑
i∈O(1,0,1)
I(Gi = n&EE) log
[
pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ2n&EE)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,0,0)
I(Gi = n&NN) log [pii:n&NN]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,1)
I(Gi = c&EE) log
[
pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,1)
I(Gi = c&EN) log
[
pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ2c&EN,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,1)
I(Gi = n&EE) log
[
pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ2n&EE)
]
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+
∑
i∈O(1,?,0)
I(Gi = c&NE) log [pii:c&NE]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,0)
I(Gi = c&NN) log [pii:c&NN]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,0)
I(Gi = n&NN) log [pii:n&NN]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,1)
I(Gi = c&EE) log
[
pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,0, σ2c&EE,0)
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,1)
I(Gi = c&NE) log
[
pii:c&NE Ni(Xiβc&NE,0, σ2c&NE,0)
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,1)
I(Gi = n&EE) log
[
pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ2n&EE)
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,0)
I(Gi = c&EN) log [pii:c&EN]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,0)
I(Gi = c&NN) log [pii:c&NN]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,0)
I(Gi = n&NN) log [pii:n&NN]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&EE) log [pii:c&EE] +
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&EN) log [pii:c&EN]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&NE) log [pii:c&NE] +
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&NN) log [pii:c&NN]
+
∑
i∈O(1,0,?)
I(Gi = n&EE) log [pii:n&EE] +
∑
i∈O(1,0,?)
I(Gi = n&NN) log [pii:n&NN]
where I(·) is the general indicator function. The E-step of the EM algorithm computes the conditional probabilities of
each stratum, given the current estimate θ(t)sci, t = 0, 1, ...:
• for i ∈ O(1, 1, 1)
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) =
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1) + pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1)
P(t)(Gi = c&EN) =
pi(t)i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1) + pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1)
P(t)(Gi = c&NE) = P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 1, 0)
P(t)(Gi = c&NE) =
pi(t)i:c&NE
pi(t)i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN
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P(t)(Gi = c&NN) =
pi(t)i:c&NN
pi(t)i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 0, 1)
P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = 1
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = c&NE)
= P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 0, 0)
P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 1
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = c&NE)
= P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, ?, 1)
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) =
=
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1) + pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1) + pi
(t)
i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
P(t)(Gi = c&EN) =
=
pi(t)i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1) + pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1) + pi
(t)
i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
P(t)(Gi = n&EE) =
=
pi(t)i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1) + pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1) + pi
(t)
i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
• for i ∈ O(1, ?, 0)
P(t)(Gi = c&NE) =
pi(t)i:c&NE
pi(t)i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&NN) =
pi(t)i:c&NN
pi(t)i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
P(t)(Gi = n&NN) =
pi(t)i:n&NN
pi(t)i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
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P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = 0
• for i ∈ O(0, ?, 1)
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) =
=
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,0, σ
2(t)
c&EE,0)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,0, σ
2(t)
c&EE,0) + pi
(t)
i:c&NE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&NE,0, σ
2(t)
c&NE,0) + pi
(t)
i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
P(t)(Gi = c&NE) =
=
pi(t)i:c&NE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&NE,0, σ
2(t)
c&NE,0)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,0, σ
2(t)
c&EE,0) + pi
(t)
i:c&NE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&NE,0, σ
2(t)
c&NE,0) + pi
(t)
i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
P(t)(Gi = n&EE) =
=
pi(t)i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
pi(t)i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,0, σ
2(t)
c&EE,0) + pi
(t)
i:c&NE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&NE,0, σ
2(t)
c&NE,0) + pi
(t)
i:n&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
n&EE , σ
2(t)
n&EE)
P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(0, ?, 0)
P(t)(Gi = c&EN) =
pi(t)i:c&EN
pi(t)i:c&EN + pi
(t)
i:c&NN + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&NN) =
pi(t)i:c&NN
pi(t)i:c&EN + pi
(t)
i:c&NN + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
P(t)(Gi = n&NN) =
pi(t)i:n&NN
pi(t)i:c&EN + pi
(t)
i:c&NN + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&NE) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 1, ?)
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) =
pi(t)i:c&EE
pi(t)i:c&EE + pi
(t)
i:c&EN + pi
(t)
i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&EN) =
pi(t)i:c&EN
pi(t)i:c&EE + pi
(t)
i:c&EN + pi
(t)
i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN
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P(t)(Gi = c&NE) =
pi(t)i:c&NE
pi(t)i:c&EE + pi
(t)
i:c&EN + pi
(t)
i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&NN) =
pi(t)i:c&NN
pi(t)i:c&EE + pi
(t)
i:c&EN + pi
(t)
i:c&NE + pi
(t)
i:c&NN
P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 0, ?)
P(t)(Gi = n&EE) =
pi(t)i:n&EE
pi(t)i:n&EE + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
P(t)(Gi = n&NN) =
pi(t)i:n&NN
pi(t)i:n&EE + pi
(t)
i:n&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = c&NE) = P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = 0
The expected log-likelihood lE(θsci|D(1),Mobs,Sobs,Wobs,Z,X) is obtained by replacing the I(Gi = g) with the
P(t)(Gi = g). The M-step maximizes lE(·) with respect to θsci, leading to a new estimate θ(t+1)sci . Iterating this pro-
cess monotonically increases the likelihood function (6); the algorithm continues until a stopping criterion has been
satisfied.
The expected log-likelihood can be decomposed into two parts, one containing the parameters of the wage distri-
bution (β and σ), and the other containing the parameters of the strata membership probabilities (α), because
log
[
pii:gNi(Xiβg,z, σ2g,z)
]
= log
[
pii:g
]
+ log
[
Ni(Xiβg,z, σ2g,z)
]
.
As a consequence, the two sets of parameters can be updated separately. Standard routines for linear regression
(for β and σ) and multinomial logistic models (for α) can be exploited, weighting the observations with the current
probabilities (as estimated in the E-step). For example, updating βg,z and σg,z requires maximizing the following
function:
lE:βg,z,σg,z (βg,z, σg,z|·) =
∑
i:Zi=z,S i,obs=1
P(t)(Gi = g) log
[
Ni(Xiβg,z, σ2g,z)
]
,
with z = {0, 1} and g ∈ G, which is the log-likelihood of a normal model, where each observation is weighted with the
current probability of belonging to the principal stratum g. Weighted OLS can then be used for finding β(t)g,z and σ
(t)
g,z.
EM steps under nonignorable models
The EM algorithm can be easily extended to include nonignorable missing data processes, although this includes the
estimation of the parameters governing the missingness mechanism, θmis.
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Under Latent Ignorability, the complete-data log-likelihood function for θ = {θsci, θmis}, given the principal strata,
can be written as follows:
l(θ|D(1),Mobs,Sobs,Wobs,G,Z,X) ∝∑
i∈O(1,1,1)
I(Gi = c&EE) log
[
ρ¯i:c&EE,1pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE , σ2c&EE,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,1)
I(Gi = c&EN) log
[
ρ¯i:c&EN,1pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ2c&EN,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,0)
I(Gi = c&NE) log
[
ρ¯i:c&NE,1pii:c&NE
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,0)
I(Gi = c&NN) log
[
ρ¯i:c&NN,1pii:c&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,0,1)
I(Gi = n&EE) log
[
ρ¯i:n&EE,1pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ2n&EE)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,0,0)
I(Gi = n&NN) log
[
ρ¯i:n&NN,1pii:n&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,1)
I(Gi = c&EE) log
[
ρ¯i:c&EE,1pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,1, σ2c&EE,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,1)
I(Gi = c&EN) log
[
ρ¯i:c&EN,1pii:c&EN Ni(Xiβc&EN,1, σ2c&EN,1)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,1)
I(Gi = n&EE) log
[
ρ¯i:n&EE,1pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ2n&EE)
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,0)
I(Gi = c&NE) log
[
ρ¯i:c&NE,1pii:c&NE
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,0)
I(Gi = c&NN) log
[
ρ¯i:c&NN,1pii:c&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,?,0)
I(Gi = n&NN) log
[
ρ¯i:n&NN,1pii:n&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,1)
I(Gi = c&EE) log
[
ρ¯i:c&EE,0pii:c&EE Ni(Xiβc&EE,0, σ2c&EE,0)
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,1)
I(Gi = c&NE) log
[
ρ¯i:c&NE,0pii:c&NE Ni(Xiβc&NE,0, σ2c&NE,0)
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,1)
I(Gi = n&EE) log
[
ρ¯i:n&EE,0pii:n&EE Ni(Xiβn&EE , σ2n&EE)
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,0)
I(Gi = c&EN) log
[
ρ¯i:c&EN,0pii:c&EN
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,0)
I(Gi = c&NN) log
[
ρ¯i:c&NN,0pii:c&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,0)
I(Gi = n&NN) log
[
ρ¯i:n&NN,0pii:n&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&EE) log
[
ρi:c&EE,1pii:c&EE
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&EN) log
[
ρi:c&EN,1pii:c&EN
]
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+
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&NE) log
[
ρi:c&NE,1pii:c&NE
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,1,?)
I(Gi = c&NN) log
[
ρi:c&NN,1pii:c&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,0,?)
I(Gi = n&EE) log
[
ρi:n&EE,1pii:n&EE
]
+
∑
i∈O(1,0,?)
I(Gi = n&NN) log
[
ρi:n&NN,1pii:n&NN
]
+
∑
i∈O(0,?,?)
∑
g∈G
I(Gi = g) log
[
ρi:g,0pii:g
]
where ρ¯i:g,z = 1 − ρi:g,z. The E-step of the EM algorithm computes the conditional probabilities of each stratum, given
the current estimates θ(t), t = 0, 1, ...:
• for i ∈ O(1, 1, 1)
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) =
ρ¯i:c&EE,1pi
(t)
i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1)
ρ¯i:c&EE,1pi
(t)
i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1) + ρ¯i:c&EN,1pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1)
P(t)(Gi = c&EN) =
ρ¯i:c&EN,1pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1)
ρ¯i:c&EE,1pi
(t)
i:c&EE Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EE,1, σ
2(t)
c&EE,1) + ρ¯i:c&EN,1pi
(t)
i:c&EN Ni(Xiβ
(t)
c&EN,1, σ
2(t)
c&EN,1)
P(t)(Gi = c&NE) = P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 1, 0)
P(t)(Gi = c&NE) =
ρ¯i:c&NE,1pi
(t)
i:c&NE
ρ¯i:c&NE,1pi
(t)
i:c&NE + ρ¯i:c&NN,1pi
(t)
i:c&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&NN) =
ρ¯i:c&NN,1pi
(t)
i:c&NN
ρ¯i:c&NE,1pi
(t)
i:c&NE + ρ¯i:c&NN,1pi
(t)
i:c&NN
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 0, 1)
P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = 1
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = c&NE)
= P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, 0, 0)
P(t)(Gi = n&NN) = 1
P(t)(Gi = c&EE) = P(t)(Gi = c&EN) = P(t)(Gi = c&NE)
= P(t)(Gi = c&NN) = P(t)(Gi = n&EE) = 0
• for i ∈ O(1, ?, 1)
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The expected log-likelihood, lE(θ|D(1),Mobs,Sobs,Wobs,Z,X), is obtained by replacing I(Gi = g) with P(t)(Gi = g).
The M-step maximizes lE(·) with respect to θ, to obtain θ(t+1).
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Treatment Control Difference
Variable Prop. non-miss. Mean Std. Dev. Prop. non-miss. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. Std. Err.
Female 1.00 0.41 0.49 1.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.01
Age at baseline (yrs) 1.00 18.85 2.17 1.00 18.79 2.13 0.05 0.04
White 1.00 0.27 0.44 1.00 0.26 0.44 0.01 0.01
With a partner 0.98 0.06 0.24 0.97 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00
Has children 0.99 0.18 0.38 0.99 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.01
Education (yrs of schooling) 0.98 10.07 1.53 0.97 10.08 1.51 −0.01 0.03
Ever arrested 0.98 0.26 0.44 0.98 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.01
Mother’s education (yrs of schooling) 0.80 11.52 2.56 0.78 11.54 2.61 −0.02 0.05
Father’s education (yrs of schooling) 0.60 11.46 2.87 0.59 11.55 2.86 −0.09 0.06
Household Inc. > 6000 0.62 0.55 0.50 0.63 0.54 0.50 0.01 0.01
Personal Inc. > 6000 0.91 0.09 0.28 0.91 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.01
At baseline:
Have Job 0.96 0.21 0.41 0.96 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.01
Had Job, prev. yr. 0.98 0.65 0.48 0.98 0.64 0.48 0.01 0.01
Months empl., prev. yr. 0.93 3.79 4.27 0.93 3.77 4.30 0.02 0.08
Earnings, prev. yr. (US dollars) 0.91 2904.89 4529.84 0.91 2867.17 4420.10 37.72 82.06
N 8688 5299
Table 1: Univariate descriptive statistics for pre-treatment covariates by treatment group, computed
using units with observed values for the specified variable and using design weights.
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Treatment Control Difference
Variable Prop. non-miss. Mean Std. Dev. Prop. non-miss. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. Std. Err.
Enrolled in Job Corps 0.99 0.68 0.47 − − − − −
within 6 months
from assignment
Week 52
Employed 0.97 0.38 0.48 0.96 0.44 0.50 −0.06 0.01
Weekly earnings 0.97 98.78 164.86 0.96 109.03 162.63 −10.25 2.91
Weekly hours 0.97 15.86 22.69 0.96 18.24 23.03 −2.38 0.40
Wage 0.37 6.20 3.10 0.43 5.93 2.72 0.28 0.02
Week 130
Employed 0.98 0.51 0.50 0.98 0.49 0.50 0.02 0.01
Weekly earnings 0.98 167.72 221.40 0.98 153.14 202.65 14.58 3.77
Weekly hours 0.98 22.74 24.91 0.98 21.60 24.62 1.14 0.44
Wage 0.50 7.37 3.53 0.48 7.03 2.94 0.34 0.02
Week 208
Employed 0.77 0.61 0.49 0.82 0.57 0.50 0.04 0.01
Weekly earnings 0.77 228.64 254.43 0.82 202.82 232.66 25.82 4.79
Weekly hours 0.77 27.38 25.03 0.82 25.24 24.95 2.14 0.49
Wage 0.47 8.30 3.94 0.47 8.06 3.77 0.24 0.03
Table 2: Univariate descriptive statistics for outcome variables by treatment group, computed using
units with observed values for the specified variable and using design weights.
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Observed subgroups O(Zi,Di(1), S i,obs) Latent strata
O(1, 1, 1) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 1, S i,obs = 1} c&EE, c&EN
O(1, 1, 0) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 1, S i,obs = 0} c&NN, c&NE
O(1, 0, 1) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 0, S i,obs = 1} n&EE
O(1, 0, 0) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 0, S i,obs = 0} n&NN
O(1, ?, 1) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) =?, S i,obs = 1} n&EE, c&EE, c&EN
O(1, ?, 0) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) =?, S i,obs = 0} n&NN, c&NN, c&NE
O(0, ?, 1) = {i : Zi = 0,Di(1) =?, S i,obs = 1} c&EE, c&NE, n&EE
O(0, ?, 0) = {i : Zi = 0,Di(1) =?, S i,obs = 0} c&EN, c&NN, n&NN
O(1, 1, ?) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 1, S i,obs =?} c&EE, c&EN, c&NE, c&NN
O(1, 0, ?) = {i : Zi = 1,Di(1) = 0, S i,obs =?} n&EE, n&NN
O(0, ?, ?) = {i : Zi = 0,Di(1) =?, S i,obs =?} c&EE, c&EN, c&NE, c&NN, n&EE, n&NN
Table 3: Correspondence between observed subgroups and latent strata
week pic&EE pic&EN pic&NE pic&NN pin&EE pin&NN ∆(ZS ) ∆(DS ) ∆(DW) λM λ0W λS 0
52 0.236 0.032 0.049 0.397 0.127 0.159 −0.017 −0.024 0.276 8.61 1.03 3.67
130 0.293 0.067 0.052 0.298 0.139 0.151 0.015 0.022 0.247 8.06 1.36 2.44
208 0.377 0.044 0.035 0.261 0.162 0.120 0.009 0.013 0.290 4.89 0.92 2.26
Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of the average effects of treatment assignment on em-
ployment (∆(ZS )) and of the average treatment effects on employment for compliers (∆(DS )) and
on wages for always-employed compliers (∆(DW)), at weeks 52, 130 and 208. For each week, we
provide the estimated proportions in the principal strata; λM is the scaled LRT statistic if the null
model assumes monotonicity of employment; λS 0, λ(0W) represent the scaled LRT statistics for the
null model with constraints ∆(DW) = 0 and ∆(DS ) = 0, respectively.
week W¯c&EE,0 (s.e.) W¯c&EE,1 (s.e.) W¯c&EN,1 (s.e.) W¯c&NE,0 (s.e.) W¯n&EE (s.e.)
52 5.52 (0.000) 5.80 (0.000) 7.32 (0.015) 6.80 (0.030) 6.51 (0.001)
130 6.44 (0.000) 6.69 (0.000) 9.22 (0.009) 7.22 (0.022) 7.94 (0.001)
208 7.47 (0.001) 7.76 (0.001) 9.27 (0.026) 8.99 (0.096) 8.97 (0.001)
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates of the average wages in USD at weeks 52, 130 and 208
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses).
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Variable c&EE c&EN c&NE c&NN n&EE n&NN
Week 52 Female 0.41 0.26 0.25 0.44 0.40 0.45
Age at baseline 18.9 19.0 19.3 18.4 19.5 18.8
White 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.20 0.33 0.23
With a partner 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.08
Has children 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.25
Education 10.2 10.2 10.1 9.8 10.6 9.9
Ever arrested 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.31
Mother’s education 11.73 11.68 11.64 11.41 11.63 11.51
Fathers’ education 11.68 12.11 11.69 11.41 11.60 11.51
Household income > 6000 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.47 0.60 0.48
Personal income > 6000 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.06
Have job 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.14 0.32 0.16
Had Job, prev. yr. 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.55 0.80 0.58
Months in Job, prev. yr. 4.97 5.08 5.06 2.83 5.57 3.08
Earnings, prev. yr. 3889.6 4112.4 4379.8 1973.4 4780.8 2508.2
Table 6: Estimated means of covariates within principal strata, computed using design weights and
estimated membership probabilities, week 52.
Variable c&EE c&EN c&NE c&NN n&EE n&NN
Week 130 Female 0.42 0.25 0.19 0.47 0.40 0.46
Age at baseline 18.95 18.88 18.99 18.36 19.37 18.89
White 0.30 0.36 0.38 0.19 0.31 0.24
With a partner 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10
Has children 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.25
Education 10.20 10.10 10.05 9.81 10.46 9.96
Ever arrested 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.31
Mother’s education 11.54 11.53 11.69 11.51 11.55 11.59
Fathers’ education 11.51 11.82 11.99 11.46 11.53 11.55
Household income > 6000 0.54 0.62 0.60 0.46 0.59 0.49
Personal income > 6000 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.08
Have job 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.15 0.28 0.19
Had Job, prev. yr. 0.69 0.74 0.70 0.55 0.76 0.60
Months in Job, prev. yr. 4.35 5.03 4.20 2.88 5.04 3.39
Earnings, prev. yr. 3221.18 4112.41 3755.92 2062.57 4290.66 2775.56
Table 7: Estimated means of covariates within principal strata, computed using design weights and
estimated membership probabilities, week 130.
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Variable c&EE c&EN c&NE c&NN n&EE n&NN
Week 208 Female 0.39 0.28 0.29 0.47 0.41 0.45
Age at baseline 18.93 18.42 18.54 18.45 19.31 18.85
White 0.29 0.44 0.41 0.18 0.30 0.23
With a partner 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.08
Has children 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.23
Education 10.17 10.01 9.93 9.79 10.41 9.94
Ever arrested 0.23 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.27 0.32
Mother’s education 11.57 11.72 11.59 11.44 11.61 11.55
Fathers’ education 11.54 11.96 11.44 11.50 11.60 11.50
Household income > 6000 0.54 0.71 0.73 0.43 0.57 0.49
Personal income > 6000 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.07
Have job 0.25 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.17
Had Job, prev. yr. 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.51 0.72 0.62
Months in Job, prev. yr. 4.47 4.17 4.21 2.67 4.84 3.34
Earnings, prev. yr. 3354.86 3666.80 3622.23 1884.33 4067.85 2731.00
Table 8: Estimated means of covariates within principal strata, computed using design weights and
estimated membership probabilities, week 208.
MAR LI and (4) LI and (5)
week ∆(DS ) ∆(DW) λM λS 0 λ0W ∆(DS ) ∆(DW) λM λS 0 λ0W ∆(DS ) ∆(DW) λM λS 0 λ0W
52 −0.024 0.276 8.61 3.67 1.03 −0.017 0.268 10.12 3.79 1.86 −0.016 0.263 8.65 3.69 1.93
130 0.022 0.247 8.06 2.44 1.36 0.022 0.252 7.99 2.43 1.33 0.023 0.246 8.09 2.35 1.36
208 0.013 0.290 4.89 2.26 0.92 0.009 0.303 4.72 2.39 0.87 0.008 0.278 4.97 2.15 0.87
Table 9: Maximum likelihood estimates of average treatment effects and scaled LRT statistics
under different assumptions about the missingness mechanism.
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